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TORTS: STRICT LIABILITY APPLIED TO
COMMERCIAL LESSORS IN FLORIDA
Samuel FriedlandFamily Enterprises v. Amoroso,

630 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1994)
Derek Richman*

Respondents, a vacationing couple, rented a sailboat from a stand
located on the premises of the hotel at which they were staying.' The
husband learned of the rental service through advertisements provided by
the hotel.2 While he and his wife were using the sailboat, a defective
crossbar broke causing injury to the wife Respondents brought suit alleging strict liability against the hotel and the company which owned the
sailboats and leased the stand from the hotel.4 The trial court held in part
that the doctrine of strict liability would not apply to lessors and thus
granted a verdict for both petitioners.' The Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed and remanded this portion of the lower court's holding.' While noting the scarcity of Florida caselaw on the issue,7 the appellate court gave deference to the large majority of decisions from other
states which have applied strict liability to lessors.' The appellate court
certified this question to the Florida Supreme Court,9 which had jurisdic-0
tion pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
The supreme court affirmed, and HELD, that strict liability should apply
* Dedicated to Arlene C. Richman, my mother, inspiration as a lawyer, and constant supporter.
1. Amoroso v. Samuel Friedland Family Enters., 604 So. 2d 827, 830 (4th DCA 1992), affid,
630 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1994). There were actually four defendants involved in the suit: the hotel, the
company which owned the boats and rented the stand, the company which arranged the rentals, and a
welder who had tried to repair the boat. Id. The company which arranged the rentals was granted a
directed verdict based on the plaintiff's concession that any of this company's liability should be assessed against the boat owners. Id. at 832. The lower court also directed a verdict for the welder, finding insufficient evidence of negligence on his part. Id. at 830.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.The complaint also alleged causes of action for negligent repair and maintenance and
breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Id.
5. Id. The trial judge also directed a verdict on the issues of implied warranty and negligence.
Id.
6. Id. at 834.
7. Id. The court cited Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, 391 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) and
North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Goldberg, 520 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) as cases mentioning strict
liability as applied to lessors, Amoroso, 604 So. 2d at 834, but these cases provide little analysis.
8. Amoroso, 604 So. 2d at 834 (citing Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Products Liability: Application of Strict Liability in Tort Doctrine to Lessor of Personal Property, 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973)).
9. Id. at 835.
10. Samuel Friedland Family Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d 1067, 1067 (Fla. 1994).
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to commercial lessors."
As a theory for protecting individuals and spreading the costs of injury
over a wide consumer base, strict liability gives an injured plaintiff an
advantage over traditional tort theories.12 Under strict liability, the plaintiff need not prove negligence against a seller to recover damages.' 3 In
addition, strict liability does not require privity of contract between the
injured party and the seller, 4 a component which is necessary under the
contract theory of implied warranty. 5 Although the Restatement (Second)
of Torts explicitly applies strict liability only to sellers of products, 6 consumers have sought to apply the same liability against lessors.' 7
Before the Florida Supreme Court had even adopted the Restatement's
version of strict liability, other states' courts had already expanded the
theory to include lease transactions. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Services," the New Jersey Supreme Court held that strict liability
should apply to rental transactions just as it did to sales transactions.'9 In
Cintrone, a truck passenger, who had no privity of contract with the truck
lessor, was injured when the truck crashed due to defective brakes.2 ' At
trial, the jury found insufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the
lessor,2 ' and the trial judge refused to send the question of breach of implied warranty to the jury. 2
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the existence of

11. Id. at 1071.
12. Richard C. Ausness, Strict Liability for Chattel Leasing, 48 U. PrrT. L. REV. 273. 325

(1987).
13. Id. at 324.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

15. Ausness, supra note 12, at 297-98.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Ausness. supra note 12, at 298.
212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).
Id. at 781.
Id. at 773.
Id.at 774.
Id. at 775.
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an implied warranty was immaterial because the court would apply strict
liability against the lessor.' Thus, there was no need for privity of contract between the lessor and the plaintiff.24 The court concluded that no
sound reason existed to distinguish a lease from a sale when applying the
principles of strict liability.' The risk of harm to the public from a leased
truck was just as great as from a truck that had been sold, and the representation of merchantability was just as high." In fact, the court noted
that the reliance of a lessee on the safety of a rented item is even greater
than in a sales transaction, because a lessee is less knowledgeable and
discerning toward an item the lessee does not intend to buy.27 Thus, the
court actually identified more policy reasons for applying strict liability to
lessors than to sellers.28
When faced with the question of whether to apply strict liability to
lessors, most courts in states that have adopted strict liability have followed Cintrone.29 The few cases in which strict liability has not been
applied against the lessor-defendant are arguably distinguishable because
the defendants, in these cases, have not been classified as commercial
lessors.30 In Katz v. Slade,3 for example, the Missouri Supreme Court
refuspd to extend strict liability to a municipally operated golf course.32
The plaintiff in Katz was injured by a golf cart with defective brakes. 3
The trial court instructed the jury on the theory of negligence rather than
strict liability as suggested by the plaintiff.'
The supreme court distinguished the municipal golf course from the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 781.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 776.
Id.
See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 327-28 (Alaska 1970) (holding the lessor of a

plane strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective exhaust and heat exchanger system); Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970) (holding an oil company strictly liable for injuries caused
by a defective ladder on a leased truck); Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wis. 1990) (holding a
car rental company strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective car); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation,
ProductsLiability: Application of Strict Liability in Tort Doctrine to Lessor of PersonalProperty, 52
A.L.R.3d 121, 124 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding
an oil company was not a seller for § 402A purposes when the transaction involved a one-time lease
of a gas pump), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969); Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n,
452 S.W.2d 931, 937-38 (Tex. CL App. 1970) (holding an oil company was not in the business of
leasing oil trucks and therefore could not be held strictly liable for a defective ladder on a truck).
31. 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
32. Id. at 613.

33. Id. at 609.
34. Id. at 610.
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typical commercial lessor found in Cintrone.35 Unlike the lessor in
Cintrone, the municipal amusement facility in Katz was a nonprofit business, noncommercial in character. 6 The course rented golf carts solely
for use on the course for short periods of time as a collateral convenience
for the course patrons.37 The leasing of the carts was not part of a marketing enterprise and the court determined that there was no consumer
dependance on any representation by the city of the carts' safety."
Therefore, the court did not consider the city to be a commercial lessor
and upheld the trial court's refusal to apply strict liability against it.39
More than a decade after Cintrone extended strict liability to lessors,
the Florida Supreme Court adopted strict liability in tort as a valid cause
of action.4" In West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.," the Florida Supreme
Court recognized that the principles of the Restatement dealing with strict
liability were natural extensions of Florida caselaw 2 The plaintiff in
West was killed by a tractor owned by another party. 3 At trial in federal
court, the jury found that the tractor was defectively made.' On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court requesting direction regarding the application of strict liability to manufacturers.45
In responding to the Fifth Circuit's question, 6 the Florida Supreme
Court recognized that a manufacturer has a duty toward the consuming
public, regardless of privity, when the manufacturer markets a potentially
dangerous product.47 The court stated that it was taking a more realistic
approach to products liability48 by expressly adopting strict liability for
manufacturers than by requiring privity of contract. In differentiating
the strict liability theory from contract theory, the court also noted that the
torts doctrine would adapt as product liability cases increased and as market conditions changed. This observation would prove to be prophetic,

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976).
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 88.
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as Florida courts would later expand the theory of strict liability beyond
manufacturers.5
Florida caselaw since West has been almost silent on applying strict
liability to lessors. 2 One notable exception is American Aerial Lift v.
Perez.3 In Perez, the plaintiff was seriously injured when he was
knocked off a lift he had leased from the defendant company.' The jury
found that the lift had been defectively designed, 5 and an issue on appeal
was whether a lessor could be strictly liable for dangerously defective
rental products.5 6

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that strict liability
should apply to lessors, relying in large part on cases from other states.5
In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's attempt to equate lessors
with sellers of second-hand chattels, who are not subject to strict liability.5" The court reasoned that, unlike second-hand sellers, lessors may better implement procedures to prevent the distribution of defective products.59 Lessors also have more knowledge of the products they lease than
second-hand sellers have regarding their products, and, by the nature of a
lease, lessors imply that their products will be safe for use throughout the
lease term.6'
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court also held that the distinction between commercial lessors and second-hand sellers justifies
imposing strict liability against lessors. 6' The instant court recognized that
second-hand sellers may know little about their product or its history and
that persons who buy from second-hand sellers are aware that generally no

51. See Mobley v. South Fla. Beverage Corp., 500 So. 2d 292, 293 (3d DCA 1986) (retailers),
rev. denied sub nom. Gerald Walker Store v. Mobley, 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987); Perry v. Luby
Chevrolet, 446 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (retailers); Adobe Bldg. Ctrs. v. Reynolds, 403
So. 2d 1033, 1035 (4th DCA) (retailers and wholesalers), rev. dismissed, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1981);
Visnoski v. J.C. Penney Co., 477 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (distributors).
52. Amoroso, 604 So. 2d at 827, 834.
53. 629 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). The Third District Court of Appeal decided Perez approximately a year and a half after the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided the instant case.
54. Id. at 170.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 170-71. The court cited three Florida cases: W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Amoroso, 604 So. 2d at 827; and Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, 391
So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The court also relied on four state court decisions from outside of
Florida: Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (NJ. 1965); Miles v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 1377 (Ohio 1983);
and Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1990).
58. Perez, 629 So. 2d at 171. Florida courts do not hold sellers of second-hand chattels strictly
liable. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Friedland, 630 So. 2d at 1070.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 10
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

assurance exists as to the quality of the used product.6' A lessor, on the
other hand, may be held strictly liable for defects that arise after the chattel has left the manufacturer because the lessor is more knowledgeable,
gives more representations of high quality, and may avoid distribution of
defective products.63
Applying these principles to the instant case, the court had little trouble holding the petitioner who owned the sailboats strictly liable.' However, the court had difficulty with the liability of the hotel petitioner.'
Although the court recognized that the hotel was not primarily engaged in
the leasing of sailboats, it concluded that the hotel had held itself out as
the lessor of the boats by leasing out the rental stand and marketing the
sailboats.' When the respondents rented the sailboat, they believed they
were renting from the hotel, and the court held that their reliance was
justified. 67 As a result, the court applied strict liability against the hotel.68
In so holding, the instant court recognized the expansion of the strict
liability theory, first adopted in West, to retailers, wholesalers, and distributors.69 It also recognized that other state supreme courts had found little
difference between sellers and lessors in furthering the policies of strict
liability.7" As in Cintrone, the instant court believed that the dangers to
consumers may even be greater in leasing transactions than in sales transactions due to increased reliance by the consumer on the lessor and the
repeated introduction of the potentially dangerous product into the market. 7 Similar to the West court, the instant court also mentioned the realities of the modem market and the widespread use of leasing as policy
considerations, leading to strict liability of lessors who are engaged in the
business of leasing the defective product.7"
Although it was reasonable and almost inevitable for the instant court
to extend strict liability to lessors, the court left the reach of its holding
open to speculation and over-expansion. As the petitioners in the instant
case argued, imposing strict liability on lessors will result in higher costs
to lessors, who will in turn pass these costs on to consumers in the form

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1071.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1068 (citing Korpela, supra note 29, at 124).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1070-71; see also Ausness, supra note 12, at 274-75 (noting the growth of the leasing
market since 1987).
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of higher prices." Spreading the accident costs of injured individuals
over a wide consumer base rather than putting the entire burden on an
innocent victim is, however, a goal of strict liability.74 Strict liability is a
form of judicially-imposed insurance. Criticisms of increased costs and
court paternalism are attacks on strict liability in general, not on the extension of the policy to commercial lessors. As the Cintrone court,76 the
Perez court, 7 and the instant court recognized, if the general purposes
behind adopting strict liability for manufacturers are accepted, then the

same goals support strict liability for typical commercial lessors."
The more difficult questions raised by the instant case involve the
scope of the court's definition of a commercial lessor."0 In defining
which lessors are to be held strictly liable for injury caused by a defective
product, the instant court limited its holding to lessors who are engaged in
the business of leasing the product,8 and expressly rejected the application of strict liability to lessors who lease the product as an isolated or
infrequent transaction. 2 The court then concluded that the petitioner hotel, by virtue of its advertising and leasing of a rental stand on its premises, was a commercial lessor. 3 Therefore, to be considered a commercial
lessor subject to strict liability in Florida, the lease transaction need not be
a primary function of the company against whom strict liability is
sought.' Indeed, the company may not even share in the leasing profits

or control the rental operation at all." Apparently, certain significant in-

73. Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1069.
74. See Ausness, supra note 12, at 325. Another important goal of strict liability is to ease the
plaintiff's burden of proof in establishing liability. Id. at 324. This goal is equally served whether strict
liability is held against sellers or lessors.
75. See Friedland, 630 So. 2d at 1069. The entire strict liability theory depends heavily on the
assumption that a lone injured plaintiff cannot bear the costs of injury as well as commercial lessors or
sellers. See Ausness, supra note 12, at 325. This assumption may not necessarily be true in every case.
76. Cintrone, 212 A.2d at 781.
77. Perez, 629 So. 2d at 170-71.
78. Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1069.
79. Professor Ausness argues that courts should be more elaborate in articulating which lease
transactions are subject to strict liability and which are not. See Ausness, supra note 12, at 324-47.
Professor Ausness concludes that strict liability should apply in all lease transactions other than those
involving fixtures on realty and some postmanufacturing defects in return leases. Id. at 350-51.
80. The dissent in the instant case appears to have had the same difficulty with the court's holding the hotel strictly liable. Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1071 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent was disturbed by the "serious overtones" of holding the hotel strictly liable
when the leasing of rental boats was only an incidental part of its business, but Justice McDonald did
not elaborate. Id. (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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volvement in the leasing operations, such as the advertising and leasing of
6
space in the instant case, is sufficient to impose strict liability.
If the petitioner hotel had controlled the rental boat operation, its
status as a commercial lessor subject to strict liability would be clearer. 7
Unlike the municipality in Katz, the instant petitioner used the rental service as part of a marketing strategy,88 profited from the service," and
represented that the service used safe products.' The petitioner was not
the owner of the rental service,9 however, and extending strict liability to
a nonowner of a leasing operation creates some policy concerns.
For instance, a company that merely advertises for a rental service
provided by another company will not have the knowledge of the rented
product that the instant court and the Perez court relied on in distinguishing lessors from second-hand sellers.92 Additionally, rather than insuring
against loss by spreading the costs of possible accidents due to the rented
product, the extension of strict liability to companies with only significant
ties to a leasing operation will likely encourage those companies to simply
break those ties in order to avoid the consequences of strict liability. Thus,
the goal of spreading the costs of injury is not furthered by including
companies such as the instant petitioner hotel in the definition of commercial lessors.
In extending strict liability to the hotel, the instant court gave great
deference to the reasonable expectations of the consumer in obtaining a
safe rental boat.93 According to the court, by holding itself out as the lessor, the hotel had given its own guarantee that the boats were safe.'
While this reasoning is valid, it is perhaps more appropriate to an analysis
of implied warranty in contract, in which a supplier impliedly warrants
that a product is safe.95
86. See id.
87. In the appellate court, the plaintiffs had argued that the hotel held itself out as being in control of the sailboat rental service, and were thus precluded under agency theory from denying liability.
Amoroso. 604 So. 2d at 831-42. The appellate court agreed that an agency relationship could have
existed, and that it had been an error on the part of the lower court to grant a directed verdict to the
hotel petitioner. Id. at 832. Although this merely means that a jury would be allowed to find that the
hotel held themselves out as controllers of the leases, both the appellate court, id., and the supreme
court, Friedland.630 So. 2d at 1071, appear to have implicitly found that the hotel had held itself out
as the lessors, and the owners of the boats had been the apparent agents of the hotel. This combination
of agency and strict liability, however, was not explicitly discussed by the supreme court, leaving its
decision open to the ambiguity herein discussed.
88. Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1071.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. id.
92. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
93. Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1071.
94. Id.
95. It must be remembered that one reason an injured plaintiff would prefer strict liability as a

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss1/10

8

Richman: Torts: Strict Liability Applied to Commercial Lessors in Florida
CASE COMMENTS

Another difficulty with the instant court's reasoning is that if consumer expectations coupled with a company's holding out of a rental product
as safe is sufficient to trigger strict liability, then the same reasoning will
apply to isolated or infrequent transactions.96 A consumer or member of
the public who may be harmed by a defective product has the same expectations for the safety of the product regardless of whether the lessor has
regularly leased the product or has leased the product only infrequently.97
If the lessor's knowledge of the product and ability to spread the costs of
accidents are ignored as policy considerations, then the court's exception
for infrequent, isolated lease transactions makes little sense.
In extending the doctrine of strict liability in tort to commercial lessors, the Florida Supreme Court in the instant case followed a logical
course laid out by other states' courts.98 The realities of a growing leasing market justify the imposition of strict liability on commercial lessors." The challenge Florida courts face now is defining who will be
considered a commercial lessor,"ro because the Florida Supreme Court's
definition and application of the term is over-broad and ambiguous.

doctrine of recovery is that there is no requirement of privity of contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965), as there is in an implied warranty theory, see Ausness, supra note 12, at
297-98. In Amoroso, the respondent wife had no privity of contract with the lessors of the boat, much
less the hotel. Amoroso, 604 So. 2d at 831-32. The Amoroso court could have based its decision on
apparent agency and implied warranty, or even estoppel due to the hotel's actions in holding itself out
as lessor. See id. at 831-33. The court instead applied strict liability due to the respondent wife's reliance on the hotel's representations. Id. at 834. The court apparently failed to realize that strict liability
would also apply for an injured plaintiff who did not receive information about the lessor. See id. This
leaves no valid policy reason for applying strict liability against the hotel. See supra notes 93-95 and
accompanying text. Perhaps this is why Justice McDonald in the instant case suggested that the theory
of implied warranty should be used against the hotel. See Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1071 (McDonald,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. This result does not comply with the Florida Supreme Court's exclusion of such transactions.
Friedland,630 So. 2d at 1071.
97. A consumer or user of a leased product should not have any expectation of safety from an
isolated or infrequent lease transaction; the consumer should know that the lessor does not make the
transaction often. This notion, however, ignores the realities of lease transactions in which, as the
Cintrone court noted, the lessees depend more heavily on the lessors than in normal sales transactions,
regardless of the frequency of the lessor's leasing activities. Cintrone, 212 A.2d at 781. In addition,
this notion presumes that the injured party knows the identity of the lessor. Where the lessor's identity
is unknown, an infrequent lessor cannot be distinguished, and thus the lessee's expectations cannot be
altered. An injured plaintiff relying on strict liability needs no privity, and thus may not know who
introduced the product into the stream of commerce. See supra note 95. The only way to justify not
applying strict liability in such a circumstance is to disregard consumer expectation, as with implied
warranty, and instead look to the lessor's knowledge of the product, ability to prevent accidents with
this knowledge, and incentive to spread the costs in the event of injury.
98. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
100. See Friedland, 630 So. 2d at 1068, 1070.
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